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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2401 
___________ 
 
DAN YAN WU, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
               Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A097-841-260) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Donald Farlise 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 9, 2013 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 10, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Dan Yan Wu, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of a decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her motion to reopen her 
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immigration proceedings.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
 In 2006, an Immigration Judge found Wu removable from the United States 
because she did not have valid entry and travel documents and because she was likely to 
become a public charge.  The Immigration Judge also denied Wu’s applications for 
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  Wu, 
who was a Jehovah’s Witness, claimed that she feared persecution based on her religion.  
The BIA dismissed Wu’s appeal in 2008 and Wu did not seek judicial review. 
 In January 2013, Wu filed a motion to reopen her immigration proceedings in 
order to apply for asylum.  Wu attested that in 2012 she began attending the Church of 
Grace to Fujianese.  She stated that she fears she will be persecuted if removed to China 
because she will not attend a government-sanctioned church.  Wu argued that, since her 
merits hearing, conditions in China have changed and there is increased persecution of 
Christians who attend unauthorized churches.  The BIA denied relief and this petition for 
review followed.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We review the denial of a 
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.  Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 495 (3d Cir. 
2012).  Under this standard, we will not disturb the BIA’s decision unless it is arbitrary, 
irrational, or contrary to law.  Id.   
 As recognized by the BIA, a motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 
days of a final order of removal.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  There is no time limit, 
however, on the filing of a motion to reopen to apply for asylum or withholding of 
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removal “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the 
country to which removal has been ordered . . . .”  Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  To the extent 
Wu’s claim is based on a new religious practice or a change in her personal 
circumstances, she may file an asylum application beyond the 90-day statutory period 
only if she establishes changed country conditions.  Liu v. Att’y Gen. 555 F.3d 145, 150 
(3d Cir. 2009).   
 Wu does not dispute that her motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after 
the final removal order in her case, but she contends that, contrary to the BIA’s decision, 
she established changed conditions in China.  She argues that the 2011 Annual Report by 
the China Aid Association reflects that cases of persecution in China have risen since 
2006.  She notes, for example, that the report states that the number of people persecuted 
increased from 665 in 2006 to 4322 in 2011.   
 In concluding that this report did not establish changed country conditions, the 
BIA explained that it appeared that China Aid’s definition of persecution is broader than 
what constitutes persecution for purposes of asylum law.  The BIA also stated that, even 
if there has been a rise in incidents of harm, the new evidence shows that there has been a 
rise in the number of Christians since Wu’s last hearing, and that the evidence submitted 
at that hearing reflects that the number of Protestants was estimated to be growing at a 
rate of 600,000 a year.  The BIA thus ruled that Wu had not shown that “she has a 
materially greater risk of persecution in China now than at the time of the last hearing.”  
A.R. at 4.   
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 Wu does not address the BIA’s reasoning in her brief.  The BIA’s finding that 
China Aid’s definition of persecution may be broader than the definition used for 
purposes of asylum is arguably supported by the tables in the report, which state that 
4322 people were persecuted in 2011 but that less than one-third of that number were 
detained or abused.  The BIA also correctly recognizes that the report does not take into 
account the reported growing population of Christians in China.  Wu has not shown that 
the BIA’s decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.    
   Wu further argues that the BIA did not adequately consider the evidence she 
submitted in support of her motion to reopen.  The BIA recognized that, in addition to the 
China Aid report, Wu submitted news articles and other reports about religion in China, 
but the BIA found that these documents addressed specific instances of harm, not a 
material change in conditions for Christians.  Wu does not point to any evidence that the 
BIA did not address that establishes changed country conditions.  She has not shown that 
the BIA abused its discretion. 
 Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.    
